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Organizing Our Thoughts:
“Global Systems” and the
Challenge of Writing a More
Complex History
WITH A DEEP REVERENCE for science and at a high level of generalization,
Alan Wood advocates writing what he calls “global systems history”—an
account of events that draws on the work of complex systems theorists
and, in its best realization, “balances unity with diversity, the general with
the particular, the whole with the parts, the macrocosmic with the mi-
croscopic, the synthetic with the analytic.” Professor Wood identifies five
characteristics of complex systems that he finds most valuable for global
history scholars: emergence, feedback, interconnectivity, self-organization,
and cooperation. These attributes “grew out of the observation of physical,
chemical, and biological processes in the natural realm.” He believes that
“a new [global systems] view” of history is needed because our problems
today “are systemic, interdependent, interdisciplinary, and interconnected,”
though, presumably, so were the problems of the past. Whether our under-
standing of “the commonalities that unite us” will promote a more global
civil society, I leave to others to debate. Rather, I would like to bring the
conversation down from the lofty level Professor Wood leaves it on, and
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discuss what insights a complex systems approach brings to some actual
historical questions.1
The complex systems approach is one I have been sympathetic to for a
number of years. In my first book, Citizens of the World, I examined the
business and social strategies of entrepreneurially minded men who helped
develop the British Empire in the eighteenth century. I viewed their activities
in the context of the development of Britain’s colonies in America and the
sociability of polite and industrious people in Britain. Two things that struck
me most about the world that these men created were its connectedness and
the nonhierarchical nature of eighteenth-century commercial relationships,
both features of complex systems.2
Recently I have explored these and related aspects of Atlantic life in greater
detail in Oceans of Wine. By reconstructing the lives of producers, distrib-
utors, and consumers, as well as the economic and social structures created
by globalizing commerce, the book examines how the Portuguese Madeira
wine trade shaped the Atlantic world and American society between 1640
and 1815. Using voluminous archives pertaining to wine, many of them
previously unexamined, I offered a new perspective on the economic and
social development of the Atlantic world. Instead of the traditional interpre-
tations identifying states and empires as the driving forces behind trade, I
found a decentralized, self-organized early modern commercial system that
emerged from the actions of market participants working across imperial
lines. Wine traders formed commercial networks that they later expanded
into social and political networks that served as conduits for ideas about
reform, revolution, and independence.3
One reason systems analysis has not caught on with students of history
is that explanatory paths are numerous and crowded; convincing alternate
paradigms lie ready to use. Another reason is that much writing about it is so
general that it borders on fatuousness. Consider a recent book, in this case
1Alan T. Wood, “Fire, Water, Earth, and Sky: Global Systems History and the Human
Prospect,” The Journal of the Historical Society 10:3 (September 2010): 287–318.
2David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British
Atlantic Community, 1735–1785 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
3David Hancock, Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
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by a biophysicist, The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became
Complex. In it, Harold J. Morowitz looks at twenty-eight “emergences”—
from the primordium, the stars, the periodic table, and the solar system, to
vertebrates, hominization, language, philosophy, and the spirit. Emergence,
he tells his readers, was everywhere. This seems true enough, at some level,
but so what? His capsule summaries don’t treat anything in sufficient detail
to show the power (or lack thereof) of the analytical approach.4 Nor does
Wood’s cri de coeur.
Toward that end, I will offer some examples of systems thinking applied to
historical peoples, trades, institutions, and ideas from the period and region
that I am most familiar with—the Atlantic community of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. They exhibit some of the traits Wood highlights:
emergence, interconnectivity, and self-organization. (Feedback and cooper-
ation prevail in many complicated analytic models; while important to a
complex system, they are hardly peculiar to it.) My goal in detailing them
here is to find out whether the approach tells us something we didn’t already
know.
Emergence
Historians love revolutions. Among others, we’ve identified the Scientific
Revolution, the Technological Revolution, the Consumer Revolution, the
Enlightenment, and the Democratic Revolution in the early modern period
of Europe and the European-influenced world. Part of the great attraction
of revolutions for historians is that we get to argue about whether they
exist. Some contrast the state of affairs at one time compared to decades
or centuries later, and find that a revolution has occurred. Others trace the
individuals involved and their struggles with inherited ideas and institutions,
and find continuity of purpose and method. Steven Shapin famously began
his book The Scientific Revolution with the sentence, “There was no such
thing as the Scientific Revolution, and this is a book about it.”5 These
4Harold J. Morowitz, The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became Complex
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
5Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 1.
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arguments are one version of the divergence between universal and particular
explanatory frameworks that has always bedeviled historians.
The idea of “emergence” is an attempt to bridge this gap. In its essential
formulation the term denotes the processes wherein complex configurations,
patterns, and systems arise, not because they have autonomous agency or
because they are decreed, but because they are made up of the interactions
among numerous simpler entities. The complex outcomes or wholes can-
not be predicted or even completely understood merely by apprehending
the component elements, because the “higher level” phenomena are made
up of the interactions, not simply the sum of the components. Scientific
examples include the emergence of weather from the movement of air and
water molecules, and the emergence of consciousness from the actions of
the neurons of the brain.6
Consider the Atlantic socio-economy, a cohesive, integrated world of com-
modities, trading, and ideas that first functioned in a coherent fashion in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By comparing the contacts, exchanges,
and influences among the peoples around the Atlantic Ocean in 1815, com-
pared to 1640, say, we see an “Atlantic Revolution”: the emergence of
a self-sustaining Atlantic commercial and intellectual community—inter-
imperial as much as intra-imperial—that had its own identity, even as it
shared identities with other empires.
“What?” you say! “What Atlantic Revolution?” When William Bolton
went out to Madeira in 1695, he was seeking his fortune in the way gener-
ations of younger sons had done before him. When Richard Oswald settled
in London in 1746 after having been his cousins’ agent in the Caribbean,
he was making a straightforward economic calculation that London would
offer more trading opportunities than Glasgow. When John and Randle
6As an analytical matter, emergent phenomena need not and often do not look like constituent
parts—the human body is not an organic molecule writ large, for instance, and a market is
not a goal-seeking actor in the way that an entrepreneur may be. Understanding phenomena as
emergent removes the constraint of having to apply the same historical constructs to all levels
of analysis. Understanding a customer network requires analyzing an individual’s goals and
resources—particularly relationships and information—whereas the global market of which he
is a part requires different, more impersonal categories, such as aggregate quantity, reliability of
suppliers, and categories of intermediaries. Still, this approach imposes an obligation to explain
the relationships among levels (something often not done).
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Mitchell of Philadelphia agreed with backcountry entrepreneurs in the early
1770s to divide the work and split the capital requirements of establishing
the first chain-store network in the Atlantic world, they were making a virtue
out of necessity, since neither side had the wherewithal to build the network
alone. There was no revolution here.
The Atlantic socio-economy was an emergent phenomenon. By 1815 the
peoples around the ocean knew about each other, interacted and traded with
each other, and influenced each other in ways that the world had never seen
150 years before. Simple collocation of states and peoples didn’t create such
a community. No state or person set out to create an Atlantic marketplace, or
articulate an Atlantic culture. Nor did anyone plan to develop ocean-wide,
inter-imperial commercial networks or institutions. Such structures were too
grandiose and complicated—and too intangible—to have been imagined in
advance. Yet they came forth, and contemporaries recognized them. They
were created by the interactions of individuals working out solutions to
local problems and extending the solutions through their networks to places,
personalities, and situations one step beyond, where they were adopted and
adapted.7
Approaching the Atlantic socio-economy as an emergent phenomenon
dissolves the “was there a revolution?” question. That, by itself, is satis-
fying because it avoids disputes over nomenclature. But it is more useful
than that. Much of our interest in history comes from a fascination with the
large-scale changes we can see, and the insight they give us into the variety of
ways humans have made their livelihoods and used their imaginations. But
when we look closely at the individuals involved, we often see doggedness
and slow progress, rather than breakthroughs, in pursuit of goals; small,
rather than grand, modifications of received traditions; and people attribut-
ing “old-fashioned,” rather than revolutionary, meanings to their actions.
The emergence approach embraces both scales of analysis. It points out that
great movements in history from pedestrian individual actions grow. The
Atlantic Revolution (if there was one) was not the sum of Bolton, Oswald,
7Hancock, Oceans of Wine.
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and Mitchell. It came from their interactions with other people who were as
humble as they were. And the world changed.8
Inter-connectivity
Historians have taken to networks with more vigor than they have em-
braced the concept of emergence, perhaps because networks are more palpa-
ble. The list of examples is long.9 Networks of diasporic peoples, possessing
both shared ethnicity or race and an experience of dislocation, such as the
Jews, the Huguenots, and African slaves, helped shape the modern world.10
Bernard Bailyn and Christopher Bayly have shown how networks facilitated
the movement of people and information, as they crisscrossed the lands and
seas of the early modern era. Atlantic-wide networks of traders and goods
8Jeffrey Goldstein’s definition of emergence is useful for historians: “Emergence as a Con-
struct: History and Issues,” Emergence 1:1 (1999): 49–72. See also Peter A. Corning, “The
Re-Emergence of ‘Emergence’: A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory,” Complexity 7:6
(2002): 18–30.
9The published historical scholarship that deploys network analysis is voluminous. Bernard
Farber, Guardians of Virtue: Salem Families in 1800 (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Jerome
H. Wood, Jr., Conestoga Crossroads: Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1730–1790 (Harrisburg: Penn-
sylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1979), 93–112; Darrett and Anita Rutman, A
Place in Time: Middlesex County, Virginia, 1650–1750 (New York: Norton, 1984); Lorena S.
Walsh, “Community Networks in the Early Chesapeake,” in Lois G. Carr et al., eds., Colonial
Chesapeake Society (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 200–241; Peter
Bearman, Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk England, 1540–
1640 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993); John Padgett and Christopher Ansell,
“Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1993): 1259–
1319; Rosalind Beiler, “Distributing Aid to Believers in Need: The Religious Foundations of
Transatlantic Migration,” Pennsylvania History 64, Supplement (1997): 73–87; Leos Müller,
The Merchant Houses of Stockholm, c. 1640–1800: A Comparative Study of Early-Modern
Entrepreneurial Behavior (Uppsala: S. Academiae Ubsaliensis, 1998); R. Darrell Meadows,
“Engineering Exile: Social Networks and the French Atlantic Community, 1789–1809,” French
Historical Studies 23 (2000): 67–102. Network analysis is especially useful for the study of
business history. Scholars who incorporate such theory, apart from those already mentioned,
include: Mary B. Rose, Firms, Networks and Business Values: The British and American Cotton
Industries since 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Silvia Marzagalli, Les
Boulevards de la fraude: le négoce maritime et le Blocus continental, 1806–1813 (Villeneuve
d’Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 1999); Nuala Zahedieh, “Credit, Risk and Repu-
tation in Late Seventeenth-Century Colonial Trade,” Research in Maritime History 15 (1998):
53–74.
10Richard L. Kagan and Philip D. Morgan, eds., Atlantic Diasporas: Jews, Conversos, and
Crypto-Jews in the Age of Mercantilism, 1500–1800 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2009); Bertrand Van Ruymbeke, From New Babylon to Eden: The Huguenots and Their
Migration to Colonial South Carolina (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2006);




served as the integument of an evolving inter-imperial economy, as Daviken
Studnicki-Gizbert and I have demonstrated.11 Much like scholars working
in ancillary disciplines, from the sciences and mathematics to economics and
sociology, historians discovered networks, shifting the focus from individual
agents and discrete phenomena to the universe of relationships.12
Network analysis offers historians a social conception of agents and
agency, with people, actions, and institutions embedded in webs of re-
lationships and patterns of interaction. One of the most robust findings
is that individuals connect to the world through others whose networks
do not completely overlap their own. The sociologist Mark Granovetter
first drew attention to this phenomenon, emphasizing how social networks
generally yet incompletely overlap.13 The physicist-sociologist Duncan
Watts and the mathematician Stephen Strogatz formalized this insight,
demonstrating how, if agents have partially overlapping networks, it
takes only a handful of “super-connectors” to create a “small world,”
where each agent is connected to all or most of the others by a few
intermediaries.14
11Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1955); Christopher Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence
Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996); Hancock, Oceans of Wine; Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, A Nation upon the Ocean
Sea: Portugal’s Atlantic Diaspora and the Crisis of the Spanish Empire, 1492–1640 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007).
12Two nonhistorians exerting a great influence on historians are Michel Callon and Bruno
Latour. The sociologist Michel Callon maps material/semiotic relationships in society. His
most famous essay describes stages in which marine biologists, working to restock a bay with
scallops, created a network in which members agreed to build and defend the effort. “Some
Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of
St Brieuc Bay,” in John Law, ed., Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986). The sociologist Bruno Latour adopts a more
heterodox view: the work of scientists was not a product of scientific principle or experiment
but of scientists’ beliefs, traditions, and practices; network members include not only sellers and
buyers but also commodities, ledgers, monies, even attire. Science in Action: How to Follow
Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
13Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78
(1973): 1360–1380, and “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited,” in Pe-
ter Marsden and Nan Lin, eds., Social Structure and Network Analysis (Beverley Hills: Sage
Publications, 1982), 105–130. Granovetter’s original article is one of the most cited in the
sociological literature.
14D. J. Watts and S. H. Strogatz, “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks,” Nature
(1998), 393, 440–42. Watts summarizes the finding in Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected
Age (New York: Norton, 2003), 38–42, 83–91.
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How does this shape our understanding of the history of early modern
commerce? In the eighteenth century many, perhaps most, traders stayed
local, dealing with the relatively small number of people they personally
knew, but the more ambitious and successful among them managed their
suppliers, customers, and even competitors to maintain networks that con-
nected customers in the Americas, Europe, Africa, and India with producers
in Portugal, Scotland, Sweden, France, Spain, England, the Netherlands,
and Italy.15 The super-connector George Frey, a German who ran a tavern,
general store, and milling operation in Middletown, Pennsylvania, between
1760 and 1800 was one such trader. Frey managed his retailing businesses
by building and nurturing connections to rural suppliers and patrons. By
the late 1760s, however, he needed a greater variety of drink and a greater
amount of credit, so he turned to Philadelphia and began calling on its mer-
chants for European wines and British manufactures. Some of them also
became customers for the barter goods he accepted in Middletown.16
Frey’s network did not remain confined to local, colonial, or even impe-
rial channels. He developed a business exporting grain and flour, sending
the bulk of it to a customer in Delaware for retransport to Iberia, along
with hardware, deer skins, and agricultural products. As the grain busi-
ness grew more valuable than merchandising, Frey adjusted his network,
directly seeking European buyers for Pennsylvania grain and flour and Eu-
ropean suppliers of manufactured goods. During the American Revolution,
he backed his own adventures to the Wine Islands and elsewhere, carrying
wheat and other grains and returning with liquor, salt, oil, and fruit. Over-
seas adventures like these became an important component of his business,
and in time he linked himself to numerous Atlantic port merchants. Frey
enhanced his international trade by also widening his customer network at
home. He could have sold his imports in Philadelphia, but its market was
competitive and frequently glutted. Instead, he looked to the backcountry
15Hancock, Oceans of Wine, chap. 5, n. 28.
16On Frey, see David Hancock, “The Triumphs of Mercury: Connection and Control in the
Emerging Atlantic Economy,” in Bernard Bailyn, ed., Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent




traders, becoming a major wine supplier to Pennsylvania wheat farmers and
Virginia and Maryland tobacco planters.
Now, this is not the story of early modern trade that imperial historians
have described. Frey operated from Middletown, not a port and hardly a
center of commerce. His supply lines led outside the empire and for the
most part avoided the mother country. While his ties to Germany might
be explained by his origin, much of his trading was with Iberia. Nor is
it the story domestic historians have told. Frey’s Middletown was not a
self-sufficient agricultural community, but was integrated into markets and
ideas that extended far beyond the coastal communities of Philadelphia and
Wilmington to the wide oceanic marketplace.
Networks are “any collection of actors . . . that pursue repeated, enduring
exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate
organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise dur-
ing the exchange relationships.”17 They operate in contrast to happenstance
or episodic relationships, and to a hierarchy’s recognized lines of author-
ity. Frey and his fellow inhabitants of the eighteenth-century Atlantic world
created networks to marshal dispersed resources and to mitigate the swings
in supply and demand, the fickleness of consumers, and the unreliability
of distributors. The commercial, informational, and social networks they
created gave them access to useful, widely dispersed information about con-
sumers’ tastes, the successes and failures of other merchants, the prosecution
or overlooking of infractions of commercial laws, and the like.
The networks were “flat,” and the relationships among members were lat-
eral, at least to the degree that each participant had the right to participate
in a transaction or decline to. Power inequities of wealth and experience ex-
isted, of course, but it was nearly impossible for traders to force a particular
outcome; everything was open to negotiation.
In a flat world, reputation is paramount, because there are few formal
avenues for resolving disputes. This was the case in the Atlantic demesne
among inter-nationals and inter-imperials in the early modern period.
17Joel M. Podolny and Karen L. Page, “Network Forms of Organization,” Annual Review
of Sociology 24 (1998): 59.
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Networks defined the space within which conflicts were resolved, and helped
members cope with noncooperative, shoddy, or failing suppliers, hostile
competitors, and adverse political and economic situations. They were col-
lective solutions to failures resulting from the information and transaction
costs of long-distance trade and premodern technology.
Because the networks were also essentially discursive, they could be
adapted for other purposes beyond buying and selling. Once established,
members used them to transmit information—economic, social, and cul-
tural norms; commercial, moral, and political attitudes. When Philadelphi-
ans, Madeirans, and Londoners corresponded about a cargo of wine, for
example, they also transmitted military and diplomatic news, shared their
opinions on matters such as reform, independence, and revolution, and es-
tablished guidelines for fiscal and moral probity directly through instruction
and indirectly through commentary on others. At their most intense, mem-
bers’ ties came to be ratified in contractual partnerships and marital alliances
that cut across ethnic, racial, religious, political, and national allegiances.
Out of seemingly disconnected actors, impulses, conditions, and opportuni-
ties, the networks they built created a dense, integrated, inter-imperial set of
social, economic, and cultural institutions.
Self-Organization
The idea of self-organization—that “the internal organization of a sys-
tem, normally an open system, increases . . . without being guided or man-
aged by an outside source”18—is an old one, with its roots in Descartes’
Discourse on Method and eighteenth-century naturalists’ drive to compre-
hend universal laws of form. In its present incarnation, the idea is grounded
in the work of late twentieth-century biology, chemistry, physics, computer
science, and neuroscience, all of which have investigated the ordered be-
havior of large-scale aggregates as the result of complex interactions among
many smaller-scale elements that operate according to simple behavioral
rules. The attention to phenomena that result from interactions among
18William R. Ashby, “Principles of the Self-Organizing Dynamic System,” Journal of General
Psychology 37 (1947): 125.
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individuals makes self-organization a companion concept to emergence.
Both emphasize the internal “logic” of systems: their connections to their
constituent elements, their relationships with other systems, and the pro-
cesses of growth and decay. Emergence concerns the “why are there new
things in the world?” question; self-organization concerns the internal make-
up of systems, addressing the question “how do internal structures and re-
lationships come to be, and come to be regular, ordered, and systematic?”
Let me give two examples from the world of early modern trans-Atlantic
commerce.
Consider European wine culture in the eighteenth century. By the latter
part of the early modern period, a Madeira wine culture had emerged in the
Atlantic; it was multinational and inter-imperial, Madeira wine being one of
the first commodities to acquire these characteristics. The wine was drunk in
cosmopolitan, coastal South Carolina and rustic, backcountry Virginia, in
the East Indies and the West Indies, in polite circles in London and rude mil-
itary messes along the Mississippi River, where it assumed similar meanings
(with hints of luxury and cosmopolitanism)—the heritage of an origin in a
global conversation about the drink. The Madeira wine culture structured
and constrained the possibilities for drinkers. It established whom one could
drink with in public and whom one should invite into one’s home; which
drinks connoted health or dissolution and which cosmopolitanism or patri-
otism; whether a toast at a dinner party showed courtesy or incompetence;
and how to display wineglasses, decanting apparatus, and cellars to show
one’s social acumen and resources. The “rules of the game” of Madeira wine
were components of an apparatus of social status, meaning, and display with
Atlantic scope.
The Madeira rules of the game became more structured over the eigh-
teenth century. Madeira traders came to export more types of wine, made
from more varieties of grapes. At the end of the seventeenth century,
there were only three varieties; by the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury, there were twenty-three. The correspondence between producers, dis-
tributors, and consumers shows that the offerings expanded as Madeirans
experimented with viticulture and American drinkers reported what types
they preferred. By the end of the eighteenth century, the erstwhile simple
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table wine had been transformed by experimental and market imperatives:
fortified with brandy (promoting longevity), shaken (dispersing the brandy
and mellowing the taste), aged (enriching the flavor), heated (promoting
longevity and flavor), packaged (providing different containers for different
classes of customers), and stored in a certain way (maintaining maturation
and promoting longevity). It had been transformed into a complex, highly
processed, expensive, and status-laden beverage.19
The price of Madeira rose in the second half of the eighteenth century,
compared to other drinks, and the multiplicity of varieties allowed certain
types to bear the status of rarified, luxury commodities, marked by higher
prices and prestige packaging. Drinking Madeira became more complicated
and nuanced. Producers and distributors devoted much ink to educating
consumers about the proper handling of the wine and the correct parapher-
nalia for storing, decanting, and drinking it. The correct types of Madeira,
served “politely,” became status symbols. Interestingly, there were regional
variations in the correct type of Madeira, and the exporters were expected
to modify their product to suit local markets in America and India. Specific
practices, objects, and behaviors—dictated not by elites or metropolitans,
but derived experimentally and transmitted by imitation and epistolary di-
dactics around the periphery—carried more, and more complex, information
and required more nuanced interpretation.
The Madeira wine culture, a component of a more general culture of con-
sumption, was self-organized in this period. The range of wine behaviors—
choosing a type of wine, obtaining the right wine paraphernalia, cellaring,
decanting, pouring, toasting, and the rest—increased dramatically. They in-
creased as exporters on the island introduced varietals and variations to
which they attempted to associate meanings, and consumers took up or mis-
understood the exporters’ injunctions or replaced the exporters’ meanings
with codes of their own. To create a “patriotic” or “political” wine in the
late 1790s, for example, one Madeira export firm shipped a wine named the
“U.S.S. Constitution,” while a competitor boasted to would-be consumers
that it supplied President Washington and the Federalists.
19Hancock, Oceans of Wine, chaps. 2–3, 10–11.
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Self-organizing institutions are apparent almost anywhere there is systemic
growth.20 To the participants, of course, their actions looked like nothing so
grand. The Madeira exporters regarded themselves as yeomen in the fields,
attending to their customers’ demands and fending off the constant threats
from competitors. Consumers regarded themselves as choosing their drink
and behaving sociably, although the more observant of them would have
acknowledged that they thought about “the way it would look.” Each of
them could have explained his or her actions by reference to the immediate
context they found themselves in and the decisions they were called on to
make. Through connecting, they elaborated the institutions of their local,
colonial, imperial, and oceanic environments in response to geographic,
climatic, and political constraints, as well as economic and social imperatives
motivating them.
Consider another example: European commission merchandizing in the
seventeenth century. Commission merchants based in European ports han-
dled the needs of colonial planters and merchants. This solved the economic
problem of having agriculturally productive land far from the mother coun-
try and its markets. To exploit the land, traders based in the metropolis
financed and provisioned the plantations, and sold their produce at long
distances from the point of production. Such was the work of men like
William Freeman in the 1670s and 1680s. Roughly 4,000 miles separated
London, England, from Charlestown, Nevis, where Freeman once lived and
still owned sugar estates. Outbound ships commonly took nine weeks to get
to Nevis and inbound ships eight weeks to get back. Enterprising Londoners
provided the critical supply, finance, and sales links for colonists. In the
agricultural-commercial system they developed, colonial plantations were
owned by residents or absentees like Freeman, managed in the colonies
by an aggressive and self-seeking group of transplants, and supported
by agents in urban England—“commission merchants”—who, again like
20Legal and political concepts, like the law of nations or the idea of sovereignty, likewise
became more “regular” and systematic during this period, and scholars are just beginning
to study them from this point of view. Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and
Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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Freeman, were themselves more often than not former colonists.21
Metropolitan traders and planters in the islands were each other’s eyes and
ears. Commission merchants wrote their correspondents about the prices of
the various grades of sugar in London, and how they compared to prices
in Bristol, Chester, Liverpool, and Dublin. They kept their correspondents
apprised of the opportunities for shipping to and from the islands, and
of freight and insurance rates. They passed on rumors about the credit-
worthiness of the planter’s friends and business contacts in England. By
return post, the colonials told the merchants of the state of the crop, the
duplicity or bankruptcy of other planters, and the predatory advances of
foreign interlopers into the island markets.
Historians have paid some considerable attention to the commission mer-
chandising system, to the point that we often take for granted that it was
an effective mechanism to accomplish planters’ and traders’ goals.22 But it
was not inevitable. Alternatives were available: ship owners and captains
could have sailed from port to port making one-off sales of goods from
Europe and buying produce to carry back to the metropolis. Even in a
principal-agent relationship, London merchants could have been the princi-
pals, establishing agents in the colonial ports. In fact, both of these were tried
in the Anglophone Atlantic marketplace. Commission merchandising came
to dominate because the participants with relatively more access to con-
firming and contesting information were the principals; they then chose the
agents. Because of the distances, agents needed sufficient latitude to work
quickly and decisively on behalf of principals, and this raised the specter
of conflicts of interest. Colonial planters and merchants usually had more
avenues of information about the prices of goods and conditions of car-
riage in the metropolis than London merchants did about soil and weather
conditions, and managerial diligence in the colonies. To the extent that the
Londoners acted as principals with colonial agents, there was more room for
21David Hancock, “‘A World of Business to Do’: William Freeman and the Foundations of
England’s Commercial Empire,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 57 (2000): 3–34.
22K.G. Davies, “The Origins of the Commission System in the West India Trade,” Transac-
tions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., 2 (1952): 89–107.
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hornswoggling than when the planters acted as the principals and chose their
London agents.
The commission merchandising system did not eliminate hornswoggling,
though. London agents served many masters, and acted as principals as
well. So, many of the “institutions” of the commission merchandising system
developed early, as attempts to mitigate the trust problem. These institutions
were ways for agents to identify their interests with the planters, or accent
the similarity of their interests. Three of the institutions are particularly
evident in Freeman’s career: owning colonial lands, origin in the colonies,
and providing comprehensive services. These traits were important enough
that they came to be shared by nearly all of the London agents who traded
extensively and successfully with Britain’s American colonists between 1651
and 1775.
Contrary to the suggestions of current, dominant historical interpreta-
tions, the first British Empire was not governed by a unified set of ideas,
policies, or laws, much less by a unified group of administrators. Indeed,
Freeman and commission merchants like him gave the empire a peculiarly de-
centralized commercial cast. The relationship between metropolitan agents
and colonial planters was neither legislated by a Parliament, chosen by a
“Company in Council,” nor dictated by a European mercantilist theory
designed to enrich European states at the expense of their colonies. The im-
perial geography that resulted from British military and diplomatic efforts
and the mercantile legal framework of Britain’s Navigation Acts established
a landscape, so to speak, for entrepreneurs like Freeman. But these struc-
tures were not dispositive of particular events or institutions. The colonial
planter/metropolitan agent model that dominated commerce in the late sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries was “self-organized” to solve the trust
problem inherent in commercial agriculture at a distance. It emerged from
the individually opportunistic choices of people trying to profit from the
agricultural potential of the New World.
Just as North American Madeira wine culture was embedded in the
eighteenth-century Atlantic culture of consumption, the commission mer-
chandising system was a component of Atlantic trade. It affected Chesapeake
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tobacco, Carolina rice, Swedish iron, and French wine.23 As the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries advanced, distributors dealt with greater numbers
of customers, agents, and partners, across wider expanses of land and sea;
they provided their customers with more and more varied products, obtained
through longer journeys with heavier, more varied cargoes. The increased
complexities were difficult to control, however, pressuring the individuals in-
volved to innovate in the ways they organized business and deployed human
and social capital. Activities that had been tasks—individual bits of work,
performed as a part of a larger set of duties—were elevated into roles, with
their own titles, characterizations, and expectations, and people stepped into
them. Many of the new roles, such as London commission merchants and
Chesapeake tobacco storekeepers, were intermediaries; some, such as snuff
dealers and bill brokers, were specialists. Intermediation and specialization
were also part of the self-organization of Atlantic trade, and they likewise
emerged out of the conduct of traders without being organized or controlled
by centrally situated persons or governments. The Atlantic-spanning, inter-
imperial economic institutions of the age emerged from the individual but
connected actions of people who were working out solutions to specific
problems and extending the solutions through their networks, to places,
personalities, and situations one step beyond, where they were adopted and
adapted.
Grounded Systems
Let me return, now, to the question with which I began this essay: what
insights does a complex systems approach bring to historical questions?
Alan Wood has sketched the principal attributes of a complex system for us,
and passionately argued for investigating them when doing global history.
23Jacob M. Price, Capital and Credit in British Overseas Trade: The View from the Chesa-
peake, 1700–1776 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), and “The Rise of Glas-
gow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade, 1707–1775,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 11
(1954): 179–199; Kenneth Morgan, “The Organization of the Colonial American Rice Trade,”
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser, 52 (1995): 433–452; Chris Evans and Göran Rydén, Baltic
Iron in the Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Thomas Brennan,




Emergence, interconnectivity, and self-organization, along with feedback
and cooperation, are valuable constructs for investigating historical phe-
nomena. For historians, it is important to understand that these ideas are
not just new ways of saying that something changed, people are social and
connect with each other, and systems have some sort of structure. Rather,
they explicitly connect the activities of individuals with higher-order phe-
nomena, such as the use of commodities as props in expressive discourse,
and the role of intermediaries and specialists in trade. It concerns the origins
and evolution of phenomena such as occupational roles, professional norms
and ethics, and expectations of individuals about how to interact with each
other. They move us toward a history that treats the big issues by ground-
ing them in the details of individual lives, in evidence. Evidence-grounded
studies are essential if the approach is to have explanatory power for histo-
rians. I hope the instances from my own work on early modern economic
life have illustrated how a view of an Atlantic-wide marketplace that be-
came more integrated and cohesive over several centuries emerges from the
details of individual traders and commodities—backcountry retailers who
were enmeshed with Europeans, Africans, and Americans through networks
of people, goods, and information; European wines whose distribution and
culture became more organized and structured as producers, distributors,
and consumers conversed, corresponded, and traded among themselves; and
plenty of others to keep graduate students busy for a long time to come. As
Charles Darwin said in a different context, “There is grandeur in this view
of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few
forms or into one; and that, . . . from so simple a beginning endless forms
most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.”24
24Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preserva-
tion of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (London: John Murray, 1859).
335
